Translated Turkish General Staff documents;xNLx;;xNLx;Key: ;xNLx;ACW: Ataturk Complete Works, Kaynak Publications. etc ;xNLx;;xNLx;AA: Ataturk Anafarta Battles Report ;xNLx;;xNLx;BDH: (Birinci Dunya Harp) Turkish Military Archives classification abbreviation for “First World War” documents held in Turkish General Staff Archives, Ankara, known by acronym ATASE (Askerlik Tarih Arşivler ve Stratejik Enstitütü);xNLx;;xNLx;-Appearing as TGS (Turkish General Staff) Archive Classification ;xNLx;File Number(Folder) -New Dossier(File)-Old Dossier- (Index -Doc. No./Page No);xNLx;;xNLx;;xNLx;E: Esat Pasha Memoir (3rd Corps Commander);xNLx;;xNLx;;xNLx;F: Lt. Col. Fahrettin (Altay) Memoir (3rd Corps Chief of Staff);xNLx;;xNLx;;xNLx;GCRP: Gallipoli Centenary Turkish Archives Research Project ;xNLx;;xNLx;;xNLx;Halis: Canakkale Report, Major Halis Bey. ;xNLx;;xNLx;;xNLx;HO: Haluk Oral Private Collection;xNLx;;xNLx;;xNLx;Iz: Memoir of Izzetin Bey (Çalişlar), Chief of Staff, 19th Division.;xNLx;;xNLx;;xNLx;OA: Ottoman Archives ;xNLx;;xNLx;;xNLx;Şefik: Lt. Col Şefik (Aker) The Ariburnu Battles and the 27th Regiment ;xNLx;;xNLx;;xNLx;SP: Selahattin Pasha (Commander 12 Division) Memoir .;xNLx;;xNLx;;xNLx;TOH1: Turkish Official History. (Turkish Armed Forces History, 1st World War, Vol 5 Book 1);xNLx;;xNLx;;xNLx;TOH2: Turkish Official History. (Turkish Armed Forces History, 1st World War, Vol 5 Book 2);xNLx;;xNLx;;xNLx;TOH3: Turkish Official History. (Turkish Armed Forces History, 1st World War, Vol 5 Book 3);xNLx;;xNLx;;xNLx;WD: War Diary (Regimental/Battalion);xNLx;;xNLx;;xNLx;TGS: Turkish General Staff ;xNLx;;xNLx;;xNLx;27 Reg WR: Ataturk Archive, Presidential Archives, Index No: 1000145/1: The collected battle reports of the Twenty-Seventh Regiment for the dates 25, 26, 27 April 1915 (12, 13, and 14 April 331) in which the regiment participated in the regular battle of the Nineteenth Division during Ariburnu battles, signed by Lt. Col Şefik and his C.o.S Izzettin Bey.;xNLx;
Today in the gulf, one French battleship and a gunboat have discharged about forty-fifty projectiles ...
When Paleng-i Derya is on duty, the Captain of Aydin Reis will serve as deputy fleet commander.
It is reported that one enemy aircraft has taken off towards the Gulf.
The landing operation performed by the enemy at Seddulbahir was repelled.
It is submitted that the enemy’s two funneled-one mast torpedo boat destroyer, which came from the destination of Semadirek, is entering (in attempted secret) Bolayir Gulf a thousand meters adjacent to Sazli Harbour.
The landing operation performed by the enemy at Seddulbahir was repelled.
The course of the events during the Seddulbahir Battle, which erupted on the nineteenth day of this month, is presented below...
The torpedo ship Nusret went to Karanlik Harbour and without incident, she laid 26 torpedoes 100 meters apart.
It can best be explained by an example why it could also be necessary to fortify one or two points on the coast for a different reason..
According to developments at the Italian Consulate in our city [which?], I understand that the Allies are planning to attack our capital. The plan is as follows...
The Military Attache report from Rome, 22 March 1915
With my command of 10.1.1331 (23 March 1915) at 9.40 (am) hours and the regiment command I ordered in the afternoon, the 26th and 27th Regiments took possession of the coastal sectors that they had been present at previously on the night of 11/12.1.1331 (24/25 March 1915)
Today around 9 AM one of our aircrafts went for reconnaissance towards Lemnos and will probably return over the İnöz area.
I have read your esteemed opinions dated 13 March 1915, number 7. In order to be able to invade the Çanakkale Fortifications and Gallipoli Peninsula I am in the opinion that the enemy would need a large landing army.
Commander Albay Sami Bey arrived in Maydos. I resigned the sector and their forces at the sector to the aforementioned commander.
Arrived at Gallipoli and assumed duty.
Against a large scale landing the course of action followed so far–and that is why the divisions are in rather scattered positions–will not fulfil the purpose.
From Timurtas – Cryptograph received by the Office of the Head of General Staff
The Third Army Corps issued a secret order on the day 12/13.1.1331 (25/26 March 1915) and at the second item of this order, it was said that “it wasn’t appropriate to go under the commandment of Ninth Division Commandment.”
From German Navy Ministry to Ministry of Military Command British Official communiqué about March sea attacks.
Cipher from the Embassy [which?] to Ministry of Military Command Number 2653
The telegram notified that: the Army Commandment ordered that a regiment from the Nineteenth Division were to be sent to Canakkale on 18.1.1331 (31 March 1915)
Letter to Madam Corinne
Your regiment which will be transferred to Canakkale on the 18th of March (31 March 1915) will be under your order and administration as usual until the new commander liaison is determined.
The 77th Regiment was selected by the division. Under the supervision of the Division General Staff Officer, the dispatch started on 18.1.1331 (31 March 1915) before noon as of 08:00 hours.
It was the 31 March/1st April (?) March (19 March 1331) and the commander of the fifth army, Liman Pasha, accompanied by commander of the third corps, Esat Pasha, came from Gallipoli to Maydos, then went to Kabatepe, Kumtepe and Kirte coastal districts...
Since the 1 April 1915 (19-March-331), two battalions and one machine gun company of the regiment were positioned at the olive groves of Maydos as the reserve of the ninth division.
It was because of this importance and intricacy which I have tried to explain that it was necessary to make Ariburnu strong so as to engage on the beaches any enemy who might try to land at either Kabatepe or the Anafartas and up to 1st April 1915, that is to say up to the time when 5th Army Command actually took over the defence of the Straits, great importance was attached to Ariburnu.
The situation of fortress has not been changed. It has not seen any battleship in front of the entrance. One battleship in the south of Imroz, has fired lightly towards Seddulbahir.
In respect to the assumption that the enemy had abstained to land large landing forces: The duty of the Army Corps is to immediately attack the enemy and prevent them from settling on land with large forces.
As of 24.1.1331 (6 April 1915), the 77th Regiment was transferred to Maydos again and positioned at the military camp around Kilya.
It is reported from Keşan (?) that the telegraph officers in Enez have left the town and telegraph communication is interrupted.
During battles of the Straits, since 12 February, and especially during the battle of 5 March, despite being subjected to intense enemy fire, the Commander of the Dardanos Battery, Lieutenant Hasan of Kilitbahir and his Platoon Commander First-Lieutenant Mevsuf of Tripoli, performed their duties heroically and calmly and managed to inflict heavy losses on the enemy.
The command numbered nine that was sent by the Third Army Corps on 26.1.1331 (8 April 1915) communicated that: The Fifth Army shall be formed; The Third Army Corps which is located in Gelibolu Peninsula will be serving to protect the peninsula as of Bolayır line...
The deployment of the division following the command number nine of the Army Corps was changed by the division command dated 28.1.1331 (10 April 1915)...
Yesterday morning and afternoon in the Vantrans (?) system two battleships, stopping in front of the entrance and benefitting from some support from their aircraft, bombarded our most forward 12 and 15 centimetre batteries.
It is reported that among the enemy ships located in the Gulf, one transport ship and one destroyer were going towards the destination of Ece Port.
It is reported that only one destroyer of the enemy is in the Maydos Gulf and at five in the afternoon another destroyer has arrived from Eceabat destination...
The battleship “Majestic” with aircraft assistance bombarded the ground positions in the surroundings of Kabatepe. It withdrew after firing up to 9 shells.
On 16.4.1915 Friday afternoon at 5.00 o’clock, an enemy flier flying over the encampment, threw a bomb which fell on many small animals on the road to Maydos.
Our Timurhisar torpedo attacked the English freight ship named Mannu(sic) at the Sea of Islands on fourth of April (17 April 1915) with great success...
On 5.2.1331 (18 April 1915) an enemy armour bombarded Enez; on the same day one of our aircrafts that was flown from Canakkale bombed Bozcaada; the enemy was subjected to infantry machine gun and artillery shootings...
The engineer company of the division which was building wire fence at Kabatepe under the temporary command of the Ninth Division informed that on 6.2.1331 (19 April 1915) before 8.55, the bullets fired from two war craft fell around their own military camp.
POW Report from Djevad re. Patrick E15 Patrick, who was the Consul to Çanakkale was captured as a prisoner of war. He is accused of being a spy for the Allied Powers...
The enemy at South Kabatepe was forced to retreat on the entire front. In the morning, they were stretched over a 2 kilometre long front, whereas now, they are confined to a 600 metre long front, a little further from the place where they are trying to get into their dinghies.
When I went to see the divisional commander, I was told that the 57th regiment was throwing the enemy into the sea and the order to attack had already been issued.
And at five o’clock, the 33rd Regiment under the command of (the late and pardoned of sins) Lieutenant – Colonel Sevki Bey, which reinforced and secured the centre with its second battalion and the right flank with its third battalion, rose to begin the assault to the sound of the bugle as per the order and even though this was repeated several times, the aforementioned regiment have only just left.
Artillery Central Position 14.2.1331 (27 April 1915) 1 – The entirety of the enemy was forced back to the shore. Due to their lack of carriers (lighters) they can not be all helped to flee. 2 – There is the possibility that the enemy might take advantage of the darkness of the night and reinforce its stragglers by landing forces again.
Enter story info here
On 8.2.1991 (21 April 1915), two sentinel armour which was located across Canakkale sent more than 100 ineffective bullets to our batteries in various intervals from a long distance and it wasn't deemed necessary to respond to it.
We'd love to hear from you. Please send questions or feedback to the below email addresses.
Before contacting us, you may wish to visit our FAQs page which has lots of useful info on Tiki-Toki.
We can be contacted by email at: hello@tiki-toki.com.
You can also follow us on twitter at twitter.com/tiki_toki.
If you are having any problems with Tiki-Toki, please contact us as at: help@tiki-toki.com
Close